IN Brief:
- EuroMIDS has begun the ESSOR-MIDS 2 programme for a new generation of European tactical communications.
- Indra, Hensoldt, Leonardo, and Thales will contribute under OCCAR management.
- Production must align secure processing, radio performance, aircraft integration, testing, software control, and component obsolescence.
EuroMIDS has begun the next phase of a multinational programme to develop secure tactical communications terminals for European combat and support aircraft.
The ESSOR-MIDS 2 programme is managed by OCCAR on behalf of Spain, Germany, Italy, and France. EuroMIDS acts as prime contractor, bringing together Indra, Hensoldt Sensors, Leonardo, and Thales SIX GTS France.
Development includes the F-EMIDS terminal, intended for aircraft including Eurofighter, Rafale, Tornado, A400M, and the French E-3F, while also providing a possible technology base for future combat air platforms.
The equipment is expected to replace or augment current MIDS-LVT terminals, supporting additional waveforms, higher data exchange performance, and greater European control over secure airborne communications.
Tactical data links allow aircraft to exchange tracks, identification information, command data, mission status, and other time sensitive information. A platform may retain its sensors and weapons after a communications failure, but it becomes less effective when separated from the wider force picture.
F-EMIDS must deliver those functions within the physical constraints of several aircraft types. Available space, electrical power, cooling, antenna locations, cable routes, mission computer interfaces, and electromagnetic conditions differ substantially between a fighter and a transport aircraft.
The programme consequently needs a common core design with controlled installation variants. Excessive standardisation could impose compromises on individual aircraft, while extensive customisation would divide production and support into several expensive baselines.
Secure processing adds another architectural requirement. Classified and less sensitive functions must remain separated while exchanging authorised information at the correct interfaces, placing demands on hardware partitioning, software design, cryptography, and certification.
Software defined radio technology should allow new waveforms to be introduced without replacing the entire terminal. That flexibility shifts more responsibility into software assurance, since each update must preserve existing communications modes, timing behaviour, security boundaries, and aircraft interfaces.
Multinational approval can lengthen the process because the same core equipment serves several countries. A change required by one aircraft or national user must be assessed for its effect across the broader programme before release.
Manufacturing will require consistent RF modules, processors, secure devices, circuit boards, power supplies, connectors, shielding, and thermal equipment. Each terminal must tolerate vibration, altitude, temperature, humidity, and electromagnetic stress while maintaining reliable radio performance.
Production testing will therefore extend beyond electrical continuity. Manufacturers need calibrated RF equipment, environmental facilities, software test systems, and acceptance procedures capable of identifying faults that may only emerge under complex signal conditions.
The long service lives of the aircraft create a substantial obsolescence problem. Commercial processors, memory, and RF components may remain available for only a fraction of the terminal’s expected support period, forcing suppliers to plan substitutions and technical refreshes from the beginning.
Test infrastructure will have to evolve with the hardware, a pressure already visible through Leonardo UK’s extended use of Keysight support. Calibrated equipment, test software, fixtures, and fault diagnosis can become programme constraints when the original instruments reach the end of their own commercial lives.
European sovereignty sits alongside NATO interoperability throughout the programme. Participating countries want control over upgrades, security boundaries, and future waveforms, while their aircraft must continue exchanging information with allied systems beyond Europe.
Export customers introduce another layer. Eurofighter, Rafale, and A400M operate across several international fleets, each with different security arrangements, weapons, mission systems, and network requirements. Export variants must remain controlled without multiplying the design unnecessarily.
The four industrial partners bring national expertise in communications, electronics, secure processing, and aircraft integration, although workshare and intellectual property must remain clear as the design matures. Ambiguity around interface authority can turn relatively small changes into prolonged multinational negotiations.
Aircraft retrofit schedules will also influence production. Terminals may be manufactured faster than aircraft can be inducted, modified, tested, and returned to service, especially where installation requires new wiring or structural changes.
Operators will need training, mission planning tools, cryptographic support, spares, software services, and test equipment alongside the terminal. Those elements should be produced and delivered as part of the capability rather than appended after the aircraft modification begins.
ESSOR-MIDS 2 now moves from programme structure into demonstrators and engineering evidence. Its success will depend on whether European industry can produce a secure terminal that is common enough to support efficiently, flexible enough for several aircraft, and maintainable long after its first generation of electronic components becomes obsolete.
