IN Brief:
- Indonesia has ordered 12 Bayraktar Kizilelma unmanned combat aircraft, with deliveries scheduled from 2028.
- The agreement gives Baykar its first export customer for the jet-powered unmanned fighter.
- Production, sustainment, training, and possible follow-on aircraft could deepen Turkish–Indonesian aerospace industrial links.
Indonesia has become the first export customer for Baykar’s Bayraktar Kizilelma unmanned combat aircraft, ordering 12 jet-powered systems from Türkiye with deliveries scheduled to begin in 2028.
Signed during SAHA Expo 2026 in Istanbul with PT Republik Aero Dirgantara, a subsidiary of Republikorp, the agreement moves Kizilelma beyond domestic development and into the international market. For Baykar, best known globally for the TB2 and Akinci UAVs, the order pushes the company into a more technically demanding export category: fighter-sized unmanned aircraft intended to operate in high-speed, contested, and networked environments.
The agreement also includes options for four additional squadrons, covering a potential further 48 aircraft. Were those options to be exercised, Indonesia’s Kizilelma fleet could rise to 60 systems, creating a programme large enough to require long-term support around training, maintenance, weapons integration, ground control systems, spares, data links, and mission software.
Kizilelma is Baykar’s first jet-powered unmanned fighter. The aircraft has been developed with a low radar cross-section, internal weapons carriage, an AESA radar, and compatibility with short-runway and carrier-style operations. Public performance figures place the system at an 8.5-tonne maximum take-off weight, a 1.5-tonne payload class, a combat radius of around 500 nautical miles, a cruise speed around Mach 0.6, a maximum speed around Mach 0.9, and a service ceiling of around 45,000ft.
Across Indonesia’s archipelagic operating environment, those characteristics give the platform a clear fit with long-range maritime surveillance, distributed basing, airspace control, and future unmanned strike roles. Jakarta has thousands of islands, extended sea lanes, and growing pressure to monitor and defend maritime approaches without placing its crewed combat aircraft under constant operational strain. A fighter-sized unmanned aircraft cannot replace a mature crewed air combat fleet, but it can widen the range of missions available to planners.
For Turkish aerospace production, the export move raises the bar. The TB2 became a global success partly because it combined adequate battlefield capability with manageable cost, training, and sustainment requirements. Kizilelma belongs to a higher class of aircraft, with more demanding propulsion integration, tighter airframe tolerances, more complex mission systems, and a support burden closer to combat aviation than tactical UAV operation.
Low-observable design adds further pressure to production discipline. Surface finish, panel alignment, seals, coatings, access doors, inlets, and weapon-bay integration all become part of the aircraft’s operational performance rather than cosmetic manufacturing details. The AESA radar and mission electronics add demands around cooling, electromagnetic compatibility, software assurance, and field maintenance. Sustaining those standards for an export customer operating in humid, maritime, and dispersed conditions will require more than an aircraft delivery schedule.
The agreement also strengthens Türkiye’s position as an exporter of complete defence-industrial ecosystems rather than isolated platforms. Ankara has spent the past decade building capability across UAVs, guided weapons, sensors, electronic warfare, naval systems, and armoured vehicles. Kizilelma extends that model into a segment between conventional drones and crewed fighters, where many middle powers want airpower depth without waiting through long fighter procurement cycles.
That trend sits alongside a wider move towards sovereign and semi-sovereign strike production. IN Defence recently covered Rheinmetall’s push into European cruise missile production, where the challenge was not merely developing a weapon but building an industrial base that could support sustained output. Kizilelma presents a similar question for unmanned airpower. Export customers are buying aircraft, but they are also buying access to training pipelines, maintenance practice, software updates, payload integration, and future upgrade routes.
Indonesia’s role in that ecosystem will be closely watched. Large defence aviation purchases often carry expectations around local sustainment, repair, training, ground infrastructure, and, in some cases, deeper industrial participation. If Jakarta expands the fleet through follow-on options, pressure will grow to create domestic support capacity rather than relying on a distant production base for every maintenance and upgrade requirement.
Baykar’s first Kizilelma export order therefore marks a step change for Turkish unmanned aviation. The aircraft is moving from national flagship project to export combat-air system, and Indonesia will become an early test of whether a jet-powered unmanned fighter can be delivered, supported, and expanded at a scale that satisfies both operational demand and industrial reality.

