IN Brief:
- Moog and Supacat have displayed the Raven 5 short-range air-defence concept in the UK.
- The system combines ASRAAM missiles, Moog’s Flexible Mission Platform, and a Supacat HMT 600 vehicle.
- The concept shows how air-to-air missile stocks and mobile launchers can be adapted into lower-cost SHORAD production.
Moog and Supacat have displayed a Raven 5 short-range air-defence concept, moving the UK’s fast-track Raven work toward a more mobile and flexible configuration based on a current-production Supacat HMT 600 vehicle.
The concept pairs MBDA ASRAAM missiles with Moog’s Flexible Mission Platform launcher, replacing the fixed-launch arrangement associated with earlier Raven configurations. The vehicle was shown at a capability event in Aldershot and presents a practical evolution of a system developed rapidly for Ukraine, where short-range air defence has been under constant pressure from drones, cruise missiles, and low-flying aerial threats.
The industrial idea behind Raven is straightforward but powerful. Instead of discarding air-to-air missiles that are approaching or at the end of their permitted aircraft-carriage life, the system adapts them for ground launch. That can provide a lower-cost route into short-range air defence while making use of an existing missile stock, established seeker technology, and a known weapons supply chain. Raven 5 adds a more capable launch architecture by placing the missile on a traversable platform rather than a fixed launcher.
That change matters. Short-range air defence engagements are often time-compressed, with threats appearing from different bearings and at low altitude. A launcher with 360-degree traverse allows the vehicle to respond more flexibly without relying as heavily on vehicle orientation. It also helps preserve engagement geometry and range against close-in targets. The result is a concept that looks less like an emergency adaptation and more like a deployable system that could be produced, supported, and upgraded.
The Supacat HMT 600 provides the mobility layer. The vehicle family already has a strong UK defence association and is suited to high-mobility, expeditionary, and special-operations-type roles. Mounting Raven 5 on a current-production platform helps reduce some of the risk that comes with bespoke vehicle integration. It also gives the concept a support pathway through an established automotive and spares base.
The manufacturing implications span several suppliers. A fieldable Raven 5 would require launcher production, vehicle integration, missile interface work, fire-control systems, power management, communications, operator controls, test equipment, training, and support documentation. It would also need a sensor and cueing architecture, whether organic, networked, or externally provided. A launcher without reliable target detection and track quality is not a complete SHORAD solution.
Raven 5 also fits a wider air-defence industrial trend. IN Defence recently covered France ordering mobile Giraffe radars from Saab, a story that underlined the demand for deployable sensors able to support counter-UAS and short-range air-defence missions. Raven 5 sits on the effector side of the same problem. Modern air defence is increasingly about assembling sensor, launcher, missile, command, and electronic-warfare elements into packages that can be fielded quickly and sustained under heavy use.
The use of ASRAAM is particularly relevant for the UK. The missile is already established in the British combat air inventory, and its adaptation for ground launch shows how mature weapon stocks can be repurposed when threat conditions change. That approach does not remove the need for purpose-built air-defence systems, but it can create useful capacity faster than a clean-sheet programme. It also offers a way to extract remaining value from missiles that would otherwise face disposal as aircraft carriage limits expire.
Ukraine has become the live test environment for such adaptation. The conflict has demonstrated that air-defence demand is not confined to high-end interceptors. Armed forces need layered protection against reconnaissance drones, one-way attack systems, helicopters, cruise missiles, and precision-guided weapons. Many of those targets do not justify the use of expensive long-range missiles if cheaper, mobile, short-range systems can do the job.
Production rate will decide whether concepts like Raven 5 become more than interesting displays. To be useful, a SHORAD system must be producible in numbers, maintainable in field conditions, and compatible with available missile stocks. Launcher electronics, mechanical traverse systems, stabilisation, power supply, and environmental hardening all need to be robust enough for operational use. Vehicle integration must also preserve mobility and reliability rather than creating an overburdened prototype.
The concept could also influence UK export and domestic capability thinking. NATO armies are rebuilding short-range air defence after years of relative neglect, and many want systems that can be delivered faster than traditional procurement cycles allow. A modular launcher on a known mobility platform using an existing missile family is likely to attract attention, especially where customers already operate ASRAAM or related UK-supported systems.
Raven 5 shows how the UK industrial base is adapting to a more urgent air-defence market. The strongest programmes will not be those that simply bolt missiles to vehicles, but those that convert rapid wartime improvisation into safe, repeatable, supportable products. Moog and Supacat’s concept points in that direction, where the next test is whether a proven battlefield workaround can mature into an air-defence production line.
