Saab consortium completes NATO underwater network phase

Saab consortium completes NATO underwater network phase

Saab’s MANGROVE consortium has completed its first underwater network phase. The NATO programme has produced a common architectural foundation for connecting allied maritime systems, with a test and reference environment planned for subsequent development.


IN Brief:

  • Saab-led MANGROVE has completed Phase 1 of NATO's Allied Underwater Battlespace Mission Network work.
  • The consortium's output centres on interoperable architecture, technical standards and security principles for crewed and uncrewed systems.
  • A future test and reference environment is intended to assess whether national and commercial systems comply with that architecture.

Saab and its MANGROVE partners have completed Phase 1 of NATO’s Allied Underwater Battlespace Mission Network (AUWB-MN), producing a reference architecture for connecting maritime systems from different nations. The work addresses the combination of incompatible data formats, communications constraints and security controls encountered when ships, submarines, seabed sensors and autonomous vehicles contribute to a shared mission. Further tests must establish how the architecture performs with actual equipment.

The phase-one programme ran for approximately a year and covered the technical, architectural and governance requirements of a shared underwater mission environment. Saab describes the objective as allowing participating nations to exchange information and coordinate assets without creating a bespoke connection for every combination of national systems. In a multinational force, repeated one-off interfaces increase integration costs and can leave data available on one platform but unavailable to another. The AUWB-MN approach places common standards and security principles at the centre of future integration.

Communicating with submerged equipment is more difficult than establishing a conventional military data link. Seawater severely limits most radio-frequency transmission, while acoustic links can offer limited capacity, variable delay and performance affected by environmental conditions. A platform may need to retain observations locally until a surface relay or another connection becomes available. AUWB-MN cannot change those physical limits; the common architecture is intended to specify how information remains interpretable, protected and usable as it passes between different systems and routes.

By avoiding a prescription for one manufacturer’s hardware, the NATO framework is intended to accommodate multiple national equipment choices. A navy may continue using an existing sensor or autonomous platform while conforming to an agreed set of interfaces and security rules. The approach is particularly relevant as fleets add smaller uncrewed systems to established crewed platforms, increasing the number of potential data sources and the complexity of tasking them. Common interfaces can help prevent each new procurement from requiring a separate, expensive integration project.

The consortium is led by Saab’s Naval business area and includes CETENA and IDS from the Fincantieri Group, FlySight, GraalTech, Miraya, Saab UK, S2IX and the University of Plymouth. Its membership brings together naval systems engineering, software expertise, research and integration experience. Saab identifies the completed work as the architectural and technical basis for further multinational experimentation, rather than a single commercial combat management system that the Alliance must purchase.

Security rules are integral to multinational data exchange because an allied operator’s ability to receive a contact report need not extend to every underlying source or mission detail. The architecture must support identification, permissions, classifications and decisions about which users and systems are trusted. Standardising a message format is only one part of that task: a network also needs controls governing who may read the information, forward it or issue instructions based on it.

Phase 1 also established the groundwork for a Test and Reference Environment, which is expected to support the following stages of the programme. Such an environment would allow developers to connect systems against representative interfaces, check whether data exchanges conform to agreed specifications and identify deficiencies before equipment enters multinational exercises. The announcement does not establish that the environment is already operational, or that every existing allied underwater platform has been certified against the proposed framework.

The consortium submitted a reference architecture report of more than 600 pages and an accompanying software model to NATO at the end of September. Twelve sponsor nations are reviewing the material, while the programme aims to apply the architecture during NATO’s Task Force X Arctic activity in July 2027. Those details describe the scale of the design work and the next intended trial setting; the planned exercise has not yet demonstrated interoperability at sea.

Suppliers can design a new maritime sensor against agreed interfaces and security requirements before the hardware reaches an integrated fleet exercise. Procurement authorities can specify compliance tests in equipment contracts, giving contractors a clearer basis for demonstrating that their systems exchange usable information. The standards must be specific enough to verify data formats, timing and permissions, while still accommodating platforms with differing communications and processing capacities. Those requirements will become tangible when the reference environment is used with equipment from more than one supplier.

The same interfaces must distinguish data exchange from authority over another country’s assets. A contact report can be shared without permitting the recipient to change an autonomous vehicle’s route or task a sensor. Messages for mission requests, acknowledgements and status updates therefore have to sit alongside national rules governing who can issue commands. The distinction becomes more demanding when a group contains uncrewed craft with differing degrees of autonomy and delayed or intermittent communications.

Saab expects subsequent work to use a Test and Reference Environment for experimentation, compliance assessment, capability development and exercises. Suppliers will need to connect equipment with different interfaces, security models and timing constraints, then establish whether the resulting exchanges remain reliable when communications become intermittent. The completed first phase provides the design baseline for that activity. Sea trials and any subsequent adoption decisions will determine how far the common model can be carried into operational service.


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  • Saab consortium completes NATO underwater network phase

    Saab consortium completes NATO underwater network phase

    Saab’s MANGROVE consortium has completed its first underwater network phase. The NATO programme has produced a common architectural foundation for connecting allied maritime systems, with a test and reference environment planned for subsequent development.


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