IN Brief:
- A RAND Europe and Focaldata survey finds 82% of respondents think government is doing too little to prepare for future security threats.
- Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure concern respondents more than a conventional invasion, while confidence in crisis response is limited.
- Public support for higher defence spending does not extend to agreement about taxation, borrowing, spending cuts, or personal participation.
RAND Europe and polling company Focaldata have found widespread concern about Britain’s preparedness for security threats, with 82% of respondents saying that the government is not doing enough and only 10% considering existing preparations sufficient. The results, presented around the research organisation’s Ready for 2030 conference in November, distinguish public support for greater defence investment from confidence that the country could maintain essential services during a serious crisis. They also indicate that fears about cyber disruption are considerably more widespread than expectations of a conventional invasion.
Almost three-quarters of respondents, 73%, considered a large-scale cyberattack on critical national infrastructure likely within five years, compared with 28% who thought a full-scale military invasion was likely over the same period. These figures are perceptions of risk rather than an assessment of the actual probability of either event. Nevertheless, they place the resilience of networks, energy supply, transport systems, water, and communications at the centre of the public’s understanding of national security. Such systems provide the civilian foundations on which military mobilisation and day-to-day defence operations also depend.
Only 36% believed Britain could respond effectively if a conflict began immediately. Confidence differed by institution: 56% expressed confidence in the military’s crisis response, compared with 35% for the UK Government and 25% for local councils. A major emergency would involve all three, with central government responsible for national priorities, the armed forces contributing specialist capabilities, and local responders coordinating essential assistance. Continuity of electricity, water, transport, and digital services would also depend on infrastructure operators, contractors, and their suppliers outside the public sector. Those responsibilities can intersect even where the public’s confidence in the organisations carrying them out differs substantially.
Two-thirds of respondents, 67%, supported higher defence spending, but the survey found no agreed means of financing it. Spending cuts elsewhere in government were favoured by 35%, additional borrowing by 20%, and tax increases by 19%. None commanded majority support. Sustained equipment investment involves financing choices over several budget cycles, especially where production depends on expensive facilities, specialist electronics, qualified personnel, and lengthy testing or certification. Shipyards, ammunition lines, and maintenance facilities must retain capacity between orders if they are to increase output when demand rises. The survey measures public preferences on financing, rather than establishing which fiscal approach the government will adopt.
The survey also measured willingness to take part in national resilience activity. Some 58% supported voluntary national service, compared with 43% supporting mandatory national service, while 31% supported conscription if a NATO ally were attacked. Asked about a civilian resilience programme, 61% said they would consider joining under conditions such as time off work or a financial incentive; 23% said they would participate regardless. Recruitment arrangements therefore affect the workforce available to support emergency services, supply distribution, local communications, and infrastructure recovery. The poll does not establish how many respondents would actually enrol or what training, insurance, or employer arrangements a future programme might require.
Three-quarters of respondents, 76%, wanted a more open discussion of the security threats facing Britain, rising to 89% among people aged over 55. The researchers also tested different messages and spokespeople. Among the figures examined, the Chief of the Defence Staff was rated the most convincing communicator and the least polarising, while a message stressing preparation before a crisis performed better than appeals to historical experiences of national unity. These are results of a communications experiment, not evidence that a particular message would increase defence production or improve the resilience of essential services. The practical decisions would still involve budgets, responsibilities, preparedness plans, and the capacity to put them into effect.
Lord George Robertson, the lead reviewer of the 2025 Strategic Defence Review and former NATO Secretary General, connected this challenge to the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill. He said: “The Strategic Defence Review called for a national conversation on defence and security, but little has been done to get it started.” His wider comments called for coordination beyond the armed forces. The House of Commons Library has separately described national resilience as a whole-of-society undertaking that brings together government departments, local authorities, industry, and civil society.
Ruth Harris, executive director for National Security and Data Science at RAND Europe, highlighted the practical tests facing government and industry, including whether factories could expand output and whether digital networks and critical services could remain available during wartime pressure. Manufacturers rely on transport, electricity, secure data exchange, qualified labour, replacement parts, and contracts that support capacity between urgent orders. Disruption to a single critical supplier can constrain deliveries even where the final equipment design is established and an assembly line remains operational. The recently published House of Lords procurement recommendations address related questions of supplier access, production capacity, and longer-term orders, but come from a separate parliamentary inquiry.
The findings were presented at RAND Europe’s Ready for 2030 conference on 10 November, attended by policymakers, military representatives, industry specialists, and researchers. The release provides headline percentages but not the poll’s full sample composition, fieldwork dates, or weighting methodology, so the figures should be read as reported survey results rather than independent measures of operational readiness. The forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill and the government’s public preparedness work will bring decisions about civilian responsibilities and essential services into the same debate as military investment. Funding commitments, emergency plans, and the capacity of industrial suppliers to deliver against them will establish the practical extent of that preparation.
