IN Brief:
- GMV is leading PRESENTIS, an EU-backed project using Galileo PRS for resilient timing and synchronisation.
- The work combines PRS receiver technology, WANTime, and server-based navigation approaches.
- Secure timing is becoming a core defence infrastructure requirement as GNSS interference spreads across military and civilian systems.
GMV is leading a European project to strengthen secure timing and synchronisation through Galileo Public Regulated Service technology, targeting critical infrastructure and operational environments exposed to interference.
PRESENTIS, funded under Horizon Europe, applies Galileo PRS to demanding timing and synchronisation use cases for authorised governmental user communities. The work focuses on two parallel areas: PRS-based network time synchronisation for civilian applications, and PRS-based sensor and data integration combining position and time. GMV will use its PRESENCE2 PRS receiver, developed with CIPHERBIT, to reinforce its WANTime high-capacity timing and synchronisation platform.
Precise timing is one of the hidden dependencies inside modern defence infrastructure. Communications networks, command systems, sensors, financial platforms, energy infrastructure, transport networks, and data centres all rely on trusted time references. When those references are jammed, spoofed, degraded, or manipulated, systems can continue to run while producing data that is no longer dependable.
Galileo PRS is designed for authorised users and offers access control, continuity, and resilience features beyond open GNSS services. PRESENTIS is intended to turn those characteristics into deployable timing and synchronisation products, supporting environments where ordinary satellite navigation inputs may be too vulnerable.
The spread of GNSS interference has already moved beyond military operations. Aviation, maritime transport, logistics, energy, and civilian infrastructure have all experienced disruption from jamming and spoofing, a pattern examined in The invisible war on GPS — and what it means for every business. PRESENTIS sits on the engineering response side of the same problem: detection is useful, but critical systems also need trusted alternatives.
Secure timing equipment creates a specialist manufacturing and integration market. Receiver hardware, antennas, timing servers, cryptographic key management, holdover clocks, monitoring tools, power supplies, firmware, and network integration all become part of the capability. In defence environments, that equipment must also satisfy cyber assurance, supply-chain trust, lifecycle support, and security accreditation requirements.
GMV’s server-based navigation approach could widen deployment options by centralising key management on a secure server, allowing PRS-based timing for devices without local encryption keys. That would make secure timing easier to deploy across larger networks, although it also demands careful architecture design to preserve availability and avoid concentrating operational risk.
The project also fits a wider shift in C4ISR procurement. Defence organisations increasingly buy digital environments rather than isolated systems. A radar, electronic-warfare sensor, cyber tool, or command application becomes more valuable when its data is accurately timed, trusted, and fused with other sources. The US Navy software cadence examined in Lockheed baseline shifts Navy software cadence reflected a related transition: common infrastructure and updateable systems now sit close to the centre of combat capability.
Timing is less visible than a radar antenna or missile launcher, but it is part of the same operational architecture. A sensor track, cyber alert, electronic signal, or command message can lose value if its time reference drifts or is corrupted. In contested environments, adversaries do not need to destroy every system if they can make enough of the data unreliable.
Europe’s use of PRS also carries a sovereignty dimension. Dependence on external satellite services, cloud environments, or time-distribution infrastructure creates strategic exposure. Galileo PRS gives European governments and authorised users a controlled service around which secure products can be built. PRESENTIS helps move that service from policy capability into equipment and network solutions that operators can adopt.
The project’s success will depend on scalability. A secure timing solution must work across legacy infrastructure, classified and unclassified environments, fixed and deployable networks, and users with different security permissions. Critical infrastructure operators will need products that can be installed without wholesale replacement of existing systems, while defence users will expect security and operational resilience from the outset.
For GMV and its partners, PRESENTIS places timing inside Europe’s defence resilience agenda. As jamming and spoofing become routine features of modern conflict, secure synchronisation is moving from specialist infrastructure into baseline systems engineering. The companies able to manufacture and integrate that layer will occupy a more central position in national security technology than the low visibility of timing equipment suggests.
