IN Brief:
- Lockheed Martin is supporting Nozomi Networks' development work through an offset project connected with Switzerland's F-35 purchase.
- The released first compliance module uses Nozomi Arc sensors and central management to automate assessments against DISA Security Technical Implementation Guides.
- Planned extensions include safe active polling, automatic STIG selection, and additional frameworks; automated findings do not confer security authorisation.
Nozomi Networks has released the first version of a security compliance module developed with support from Lockheed Martin through an industrial offset project linked to Switzerland’s F-35 purchase. The module automates security configuration assessments against US Defense Information Systems Agency Security Technical Implementation Guides (DISA STIGs), including checks on suitable operational technology (OT) endpoints. Lockheed is supplying funding and cyber expertise as Nozomi develops the capability in Mendrisio, Switzerland.
The project joins Swiss-based software development with Lockheed Martin’s F-35 industrial cooperation obligations. It addresses the practical difficulty of collecting comparable security evidence across government networks, defence supply chains, and industrial systems that do not behave like standard office computers. The companies have not published the value of the offset commitment or a defence-wide deployment contract. The 17 November milestone is the initial compliance module release, while further assessment methods remain under development.
Security configuration assessment compares how a system is set up with requirements intended to reduce avoidable weaknesses. A guide may specify permissible services, logging arrangements, account settings or other controls, and the assessment must determine whether the actual configuration meets the specified benchmark. DISA STIGs translate security requirements into detailed implementation checks for operating systems, applications and devices. Running those checks once is insufficient for a large organisation because software updates, maintenance work and local changes can alter configuration between assessments.
An assessment technique suitable for enterprise servers may be disruptive when applied without modification to control equipment, engineering workstations, or older operational systems. Resource limits, legacy software, and strict availability requirements can restrict active scanning or remote configuration queries. That makes the collection method part of the engineering requirement: assessors need information about the configuration while avoiding actions that interfere with the physical processes supported by the network.
Nozomi’s initial approach uses Arc endpoint sensors to collect configuration evidence from supported hosts, with passive observation of network communications adding asset context. According to the developer, Arc normally operates in user space and uses kernel-level components only when necessary, mainly in read-only mode. The method reduces reliance on credentialed network scans; compatibility and safe deployment still need to be established for each asset class, particularly where a sensor cannot be installed.
Results are brought together through Nozomi’s on-premises Central Management Console or its Vantage and Vantage for Government cloud services. An operator can examine the STIG rule assessed, pass or fail findings, supporting evidence, and remediation guidance, while relating those findings to asset inventories, known vulnerabilities, and other risk information. This gives repeated configuration assessments a common record rather than leaving each site to maintain separate spreadsheets and reports.
An auditable record is particularly useful in defence supply chains, where networks can contain servers, administrative systems, manufacturing equipment, environmental controls and mission-support infrastructure. A supplier may need to show that specified controls remain in place over time, not merely provide a spreadsheet completed before an audit. Centralised evidence collection offers a possible way to track repeated assessments across many locations, subject to the security and data-handling requirements of the organisation using the service.
Configuration results can support the US Department of Defense Risk Management Framework and associated authorisation activities, but the assessment tool is not itself an authorising authority. Personnel responsible for assurance must still decide which benchmarks apply, evaluate exceptions and compensating controls, and assess residual risk. A passed STIG check establishes compliance with that particular configuration rule at the time assessed; it does not show whether an endpoint has been compromised or is free from vulnerabilities.
Some control devices and legacy assets cannot accommodate an Arc sensor, and they remain a limitation of the first release. Nozomi plans to add safe active polling for equipment without endpoint agents, automate selection of applicable STIG benchmarks, and support additional frameworks across OT, connected devices, and conventional IT. These are announced development priorities rather than capabilities available across the entire installed base today. Each collection method will require validation against the operational constraints of the equipment it assesses.
The module sits inside a wider platform that already provides network and endpoint visibility, threat detection, and risk information. Combining those records makes it possible to investigate whether a failed configuration check concerns an isolated setting, an asset with known software weaknesses, or a broader operational exposure. Audit evidence will still need to identify the precise benchmark version and observation on which each result rests, particularly when a deliberate exception is approved for safety or equipment compatibility.
Nozomi’s initial DISA STIG module is available, with Lockheed Martin-backed development continuing through the Swiss F-35 offset programme. Subsequent releases are intended to improve benchmark selection, extend coverage to assets without sensors, and add other security frameworks. Neither company has reported a defence-wide rollout, an authorisation issued because of the module, or independently measured reductions in assessment labour. Those outcomes depend on deployment and validation within customer environments.


