Singapore tests airborne 5G and counter-drone systems

Singapore’s Ministry of Defence has detailed field evaluations of a 5G-enabled Aerial Communications Node and counter-unmanned aerial systems during Exercise Wallaby 2026 in Australia. Engineers and military personnel are testing whether the communications and detection equipment can support dispersed formations across the large Shoalwater Bay Training Area in Queensland, with further development dependent on the results.

The third training frame runs from 18 October to 2 November, with Headquarters Signals and the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) evaluating the two systems alongside operational units. Other field activities cover uncrewed aircraft, digital mission planning and communications. Approximately 6,000 personnel and 1,200 platforms are participating in the wider Exercise Wallaby programme, which began on 6 September.

The 5G-enabled Aerial Communications Node (ACN) puts a network relay above ground level, where its radio path is less obstructed by terrain than a connection between two ground installations. It is intended to extend connectivity from an existing base station towards formations operating beyond the reach of fixed equipment. The airborne position, available radio backhaul and operating environment determine whether the arrangement can provide sufficient coverage for data-intensive applications.

During the 2025 exercise, the node was tethered to the ground; this year, an untethered aircraft is being evaluated. Officers involved in the trials described extending connectivity from a base station as far as two kilometres away, with local 5G coverage extending roughly 400 metres around the aircraft. These are distances reported for the current demonstration, not published guarantees for every terrain, payload or flight configuration.

Without its tether, the relay can be repositioned as formations move, allowing engineers to assess coverage against changing terrain and deployment patterns. Removing the cable also means that power, endurance and the radio connection to the ground station must all be maintained aboard or through the aircraft. Network availability will consequently depend on flight time and positioning as well as radio performance, which the field trial can assess together.

Alongside the communications trial, the armed forces are evaluating a mobile counter-UAS system that combines sensors with a means of disrupting hostile drone links. A detection system must first distinguish a potential aircraft track from other returns and assess its movement before an operator can decide whether to respond. Sensor coverage changes as vehicles move or terrain blocks particular approaches, making site selection and equipment integration part of the trial rather than merely the performance of individual components.

Radio disruption can break the command link between an operator and a drone, but the outcome depends on the aircraft’s control architecture and its programmed response to lost communications. An autonomous system may continue along a stored route, and interference can affect nearby friendly transmissions if the defensive emitter is not coordinated with local networks. The trial therefore involves more than whether a jammer can generate an effect: detection, classification and authorised use have to work together.

Moving the detection and countermeasure equipment between positions adds practical engineering constraints. Its sensors require suitable fields of view, while electrical supply, cooling and mounting arrangements have to withstand vehicle operation. Nearby emitters and structures can affect signal reception, and changing positions alter the routes by which an approaching drone can be seen. The Queensland exercise area offers the space to examine these trade-offs across different terrain and unit dispositions.

Field feedback has already identified circumstances in which an approaching drone was not picked up sufficiently early or tracking remained difficult, according to accounts from the trials. Engineers can use those observations to adjust the equipment configuration and the procedures used by operators before further evaluation. The armed forces have made no announcement that the current counter-UAS installation has completed operational qualification.

The two experiments also share a crowded radio environment: the aerial node is intended to preserve connectivity for friendly forces, while counter-UAS equipment may need to interrupt particular radio signals. Coordination between radio planners and counter-drone operators will therefore be necessary wherever the systems are used together. Data from the detection system must reach the people making response decisions without compromising the communications they are meant to protect.

Singapore’s Defence Technology Community is participating directly in Exercise Wallaby, including the Defence Science and Technology Agency, the Future Systems and Technology Directorate and DSO National Laboratories. Their engineers are working with the units operating the systems, so practical findings can inform changes to equipment and operating procedures. The exercise also involves Digitised Trunk Communication Systems used to bridge communications across the large training area.

Exercise Wallaby continues until 2 November, with both the aerial node and the mobile counter-drone system still undergoing evaluation. The immediate milestones are the assessment of coverage, detection and integration in the field, followed by engineering changes where required. Singapore has not disclosed a procurement decision, fleet-wide equipment fit or entry into service date for either system.